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1 INTRODUCTION 
There are a number of alternative currency arrangements and monetary frameworks 
from which a sovereign Palestinian state could choose. The first is a continuation of 
the status quo, under which three different currencies are used in the WBGS – the new 
Israeli shekel (NIS), the Jordanian dinar (JD) (used more in the West Bank than in 
Gaza), and the US dollar (USD) – with the former being used for most transactions, 
especially retail ones, and the latter two used more for savings deposits and for some 
durable goods transactions (Hamed, 1999); while the Palestinian Monetary Authority 
supervises the banking system but has no lender of last resort (LOLR) function. A 
second arrangement would be the creation of a new Palestinian currency, with the 
currency anchored – either under a currency board or under a fixed but adjustable 
parity –  to the NIS, the JD, the euro or the dollar or, conceivably, some other 
currency or basket of currencies. A third alternative would be a currency union with 
Israel, while a fourth would be a currency union with Jordan. Finally, a new currency 
with a more or less flexible exchange rate and the ability to design and operate an 
independent monetary policy could be considered. 
 
The question of what currency arrangement would be most suitable for a new 
Palestinian state is one where direct empirical research is difficult. Some good work 
has been done on earlier periods (between 1967 and the late 1980s, or for the Oslo 
years from 1994), but the experience of the last few years (since September 2000) is 
unlikely to throw much light on future conditions. Moreover, major changes in 
economic policy and economic development (notably in the direction of trade) can be 
expected during the first few years of the new state, and the optimal currency 
arrangement will depend on the characteristics of the Palestinian economy over some   2
more settled longer term. This paper does not therefore present major new empirical 
work, but it surveys previous contributions, gives some new context for the issue by 
looking at other comparable economies, provides some new data on the possible 
anchor currencies, and analyses the issues in terms of the optimal monetary 
framework more broadly understood, with reference to recent research on exchange 
rate arrangements, central bank independence, monetary policy and monetary 
integration. 
 
Section 2 of the paper examines the currency arrangements which have come to be 
chosen by other economies which are as small and/or as open as that of the putative 
Palestinian state; it shows that most have chosen fixed, but not highly fixed, exchange 
rates, with separate currencies. Section 3 reviews studies of the amount of seigniorage 
which could be obtained from the issue of a new Palestinian currency; it suggests the 
steady state seigniorage gains would not be large. Section 4 looks at attempts using 
gravity models to identify the probable trade patterns of the future Palestinian state, as 
a way of identifying the optimal peg for a new currency; it finds that the largest share 
(but not an overwhelmingly large share) of Palestine’s trade is likely to be with the 
European Union. Section 5 investigates the intrinsic suitability of the various possible 
anchor currencies; it argues that the euro and the dollar would be acceptable anchors, 
but not the NIS or the JD. Section 6 identifies the criteria which an optimal monetary 
framework should fulfil, and suggests a specific goal and a strategy for attaining it. 
Section 7 presents the conclusions. 
 
2  CURRENCY ARRANGEMENTS IN SMALL OPEN ECONOMIES   3
As a starting point for the investigation it may be useful to identify the exchange rate 
regime preferences revealed in the choices made over time by economies comparable 
to that of an independent Palestinian state, bearing in mind the trend towards a 
‘polarisation’ of exchange rate regimes discussed in, for example, Frankel (1999).
1 
Table 3.1 presents some evidence on various relevant groups of countries in terms of 
the new classification of exchange rate regimes provided by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2002), which uses data on the parallel market and other indicators to identify the 
regimes actually operated, rather than those which governments announce.
2  
 
Relevant comparators for Palestine would be small and open. A new Palestinian state 
is likely to have a population of 3-5 million,
3 a GDP (PPP adjusted, 2000 prices) of 
around US$8-12bn,
 4 and international trade (imports plus exports) of at least 90% of 
GDP.
5 The first row of Table 3.1 presents the exchange rate regimes used in 
December 2001 by countries that are small in terms of population, where small is 
defined as below 10 million.
6 Of the 73 countries in the UNDP’s Human Development 
Report 2002 that come into this category, 14% were in a currency union or had a 
currency board, 25% had some other form of fixed rate, 27% had some form of 
crawling regime and 26% some kind of managed regime, while only 7% were freely 
floating and one was ‘freely falling’. The second row focuses on a subset of these 
countries, those with populations nearer to the likely population of an independent 
Palestine, that is between 3 and 7 million; there is a small switch between the 
crawling and managed regimes, but overall the choice of regimes is not much 
different. The third row considers size in terms of GDP, with small taken as having a 
PPP adjusted GDP less than US$20 billion; for these 48 countries the percentage with 
a currency union or board was smaller while the percentage on a fixed rate was   4
higher, and 10% of countries were freely floating. The fourth row reports regimes for 
48 countries that were highly open, in the sense that their exports and imports together 
accounted for 90% or more of GDP; here there were more countries with currency 
boards or in currency unions (the set included the five smallest members of the 
Eurozone), rather more on crawling and managed and less on other fixed pegs, and 
6% with free floats. The final row of the table brings together the 21 countries which 
fit each of the criteria of smallness of population (below 10 m), smallness of GDP, 
and high degree of openness: of these countries 5% (Estonia) operated a currency 
board and 5% (Tajikistan) a free float, and the rest were distributed between fixed 
(38%), crawling (33%) and managed (19%) regimes. 
[Table 3.1 near here] 
 
Table 3.2 gives some more details on this common group of countries, with a view to 
highlighting any trends over time in the choice of exchange rate regime.
7 It shows for 
each country the regimes used in successive decades, and the final regime as used in 
Table 3.1. In the 1960s and early 1970s those countries that existed as separate 
countries (some were parts of the USSR or of Yugoslavia) were nearly all on a fixed 
rate, but later in the 1970s or in the 1980s and 1990s many experimented with 
crawling pegs and managed floats and, in a few cases, with free floats. By 2001, 
however, countries seem to have returned to nearer the fixed end of the spectrum: in 
1990 14% of countries had fixed, 21% crawling, 50% managed and 14% free floating 
rates, but by 2001 those numbers had become 38% (plus 5% highly fixed), 33%, 19% 
and 5% respectively.
8 
[Table 3.2 near here] 
   5
Overall, these findings suggest that, for economies that can be considered broadly 
comparable to that of an independent Palestine, governments have never been keen on 
free floating and have become less so over time. There is not much enthusiasm for the 
other extreme, of a currency union or a currency board, but over time countries have 
tended to adopt harder pegs. 
 
3  STUDIES OF SEIGNIORAGE IN PALESTINE 
A pioneering attempt to estimate the scale of seigniorage in the WBGS was made by 
Hamed and Shaban (1993). They argued that the use of Israeli currency (notes and 
coin) in the WBGS provided a previously unrecognised ‘mechanism of resource 
transfer from the Palestinians to the Israeli Central Bank’ (p130). Given that no data 
were available for money holdings in the WBGS, they made two estimates: a low 
estimate which assumed that the ratio of Palestinian NIS currency holdings to GNP 
was the same as that in Israel; and a high estimate which assumed that, because of the 
low use of bank deposits in the WBGS (there was essentially no banking system 
serving the Palestinian population over the period), the ratio of Palestinian currency 
holdings to GNP was the same as the ratio of Israeli holdings of currency plus demand 
deposits to GNP. On this basis average seigniorage per year from 1970 to 1987 was 
1.6% of Palestinian GNP on the low estimate and 4.2% on the high estimate. These 
are relatively large numbers; they reflect in part the fact that inflation in Israel (and 
therefore for the most part in the WBGS as well) averaged 88% per annum over this 
period. 
 
Arnon and Spivak (1996a; see also chapter 6 of Arnon, Luski, Spivak and Weinblatt, 
1997) estimated the seigniorage that might accrue to a Palestinian issuer of currency   6
as part of an evaluation of the introduction of an independent currency. They 
estimated demand for money (M1) functions for Syria and Egypt, with the inflation 
rate as the opportunity cost variable (given the absence or constancy of the interest 
rate), and obtained results for the two countries which were statistically 
indistinguishable. They made a minor adjustment to the parameter estimates to 
impose a unitary income elasticity of money demand, and then used the resulting 
function, with the assumption that the money multiplier was 1.5, to predict the 
demand for money in the Palestinian economy for different combinations of growth 
and inflation. They envisaged a long run share of the new currency in overall money 
which was inversely related to the inflation rate, and a phased transition towards that 
long run share. They then calculated the seigniorage which would accrue to the 
issuing authority under different growth and inflation scenarios. The maximum 
seigniorage occurs at an inflation rate of 5%. In this case the average seigniorage over 
the first five years of transition is 4.6% of GDP, and the long run steady state 
seigniorage is 1.2% p.a. 
 
Hamed (1999) produced estimates of NIS seigniorage in the WBGS in the post-Oslo 
period (1994-98), in the context of an argument that Israel was continuing to extract 
resources from the WBGS ‘as a result of the failure of the Paris Protocol to include a 
seigniorage reimbursement provision’ (p9). He calculated a lower bound estimate on 
the basis of the assumption used by Hamed and Shaban (1993) for their low estimate, 
namely that the ratio of Palestinian NIS currency holdings to GNP was the same as 
that in Israel, but he argued that such an estimate was biased downwards because it 
took no account of the higher precautionary demand for cash in the WBGS (due to 
closures and other uncertainties) and the less frequent use of non-cash means of   7
payment in the WBGS. He therefore also calculated an upper bound estimate on the 
basis of the ratio of outstanding JD currency to GNI in Jordan, which would be biased 
upwards because it took no account of the use of the JD for cash payments for durable 
goods in the WBGS. On this basis the average per annum seigniorage was between 
0.31% of WBGS GNI (for the lower bound) and 1.68% (for the higher bound).
9 
 
The most recent attempt to estimate seigniorage is that of Erickson von Allmen and 
Fischer (2001) who attempt to assess how much seigniorage is forgone by the 
Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) as a result of its not issuing a Palestinian 
currency and accrues to the central banks of Israel, Jordan and the US instead. 
Because they have already argued in their paper for a currency board, under which 
Palestinian currency issues would have to be backed by foreign exchange reserves, 
they define seigniorage as the interest earnings on those foreign exchange reserves.
10 
They calculate the median ratio of currency to GDP for the 100 economies whose 
income per capita is closest to that of the WBGS, at 5.5%. That is used to generate an 
estimate of the amount of a new Palestinian currency which would be held, and at an 
assumed interest rate on the corresponding foreign exchange reserves of 5% this 
produces an estimate of seigniorage as 0.3% of GDP. 
 
Some interesting comparative data can be found in a Bank of England study of 44 
developing countries (Fry et al, 1996), which calculated the seigniorage revenue for 
these countries in each of three subperiods, 1979-83, 1984-88 and 1989-93. The 
authors emphasise the relationship between seigniorage and inflation, and report (p38) 
that central banks operating conservative monetary policies with a fair degree of 
independence typically produced seigniorage of 0.5 to 1.0% of GDP. In fact, for the   8
23 (country-subperiod) episodes in their sample in which inflation was ≤ 5% the 
average seigniorage was 0.53% of GDP; for the 32 episodes with inflation > 5% but ≤ 
10% average seigniorage was 0.96%, and for the 30 episodes of inflation > 10% but ≤ 
15% it was 1.27% (calculated from Fry et al, 1996, pp122, 131).
11  
 
In section 6 below it is suggested that the Palestinian state needs to aim for price 
stability in the form of inflation under 5%. The Bank of England study suggests that 
in that case the steady state seigniorage gains from the existence of a Palestinian 
currency would be, if anything, smaller than those estimated by Hamed (1999) or 
Arnon and Spivak (1996a), and closer to those estimated by Erickson von Allmen and 
Fischer (2001). Even at inflation rates of up to 10% they would not be large, either as 
a proportion of GDP or as a proportion of the overall expenditure or revenue of a 
Palestinian government.
12 The transitional gains from the issue of a new currency 
would be much higher, but it is arguable that the transitional period is one in which 
the pressure on the Palestinian budget is likely to be less acute, as the result of a 
foreign aid ‘dowry’ on the establishment of the new state.  
 
4 TRADE  PATTERNS 
There is a substantial literature on the appropriate trade regime for a new Palestinian 
state, focused mainly on the choice between a customs union with Israel, a free trade 
agreement (FTA) with Israel or a non-discriminatory trade regime (eg Kanafani, 
2001; World Bank, 2002; Dessus and Ruppert Bulmer, this volume). However, this 
research has little to say about the likely patterns of trade in terms of the destination of 
exports and the origin of imports, and it is those patterns that are important in 
considering the appropriate exchange rate regime and the appropriate anchor currency   9
(if any). The alternative technique which has been used by some researchers is that of 
gravity models of trade, which can be used to generate predictions of the pattern of 
trade to be expected for a country with the same characteristics as the new state on the 
basis of the relationships between characteristics and trade patterns for other 
countries. 
 
The first application of a gravity model in this area was by the World Bank (1993, 
pp45-7 and Annex 3), which used as regressors the logs of GDP and GDP per capita 
in each country, the log difference in per capita GDP between countries (to capture 
the Linder effect), the distance between them, the area of each, and dummies for a 
common border, a common language, being an island, and membership of preferential 
trade arrangements (ASEAN, EEC, LAFTA). The equations were estimated for 1987-
89 average annual data on 15 middle- to upper-income countries with substantial non-
primary exports, and the results then used with data for Israel and the WBGS – the 
latter under varying assumptions about border, language and trade arrangements – to 
generate predictions about shares of trade between the WBGS and Israel. The results 
suggest that the existing concentration of the WBGS’s trade with Israel was far above 
what would be expected on the basis of a common border and ‘language’ (interpreted 
as a proxy for a history of persistent economic interaction) and a free trade area, and 
even further above what would be expected on the basis of a common border only.
13 
 
Arnon et al (1997, chapter 4) used a simpler model with a limited number of 
regressors (the log of GDP in each country, the log of the distance between them, a 
common language dummy, an FTA dummy and the difference in per capita GDP 
between countries), estimated on 1991 data for 35 countries which included most   10
Middle Eastern countries, some Asian and Latin American countries, leading EU 
countries, the US and Japan. The results were then used to predict trade between the 
West Bank, Gaza Strip, Israel and Jordan for 1986/7 and 1992/3. When these 
predictions were set against the actual flows it was found that the predicted WBGS 
exports to Israel were below actual levels and predicted WBGS imports from Israel 
were even further below the actual levels; though these ‘distortions’ were somewhat 
smaller in 1992/3 than in 1986/7. Arnon et al interpreted their findings as implying 
that the ‘captive market’ effect – which acts to raise Israeli exports to the WBGS – 
was stronger than the ‘proximity’ effect  - which acts to raise WBGS exports to Israel. 
Arnon, Spivak and Weinblatt (1996) used the same model but focused more on the 
potential for trade between these countries in the future; they predicted that trade 
between a new Palestinian entity and Israel would be much lower (than current levels) 
even if there was a customs union or free trade agreement between them. They also 
found that trade between Jordan and a new Palestinian entity, on the other hand, 
would remain relatively low, even in the case of a trade agreement.  
 
For present purposes a more relevant study is that by Bannister and Erickson von 
Allmen (2001), which uses at its starting point the model of Al-Atrash and Yousef 
(2000) and aims to evaluate the potential for trade expansion under a new regime. The 
model uses additional regressors – population in each country, measures of trade 
restrictiveness, measures of transportation and transactions costs, and a landlocked 
dummy, but not GDP per capita in each country or the difference between them – and 
a larger range of countries (Israel, the WBGS, 18 Arab countries and 43 others that 
cover over 90% of trade with the Middle East), with data for 1995-97. Bannister and 
Erickson von Allmen apply the results of a base run to predict trade flows for the   11
WBGS, and find that WBGS exports to and imports from Israel are well above the 
predicted levels, while those to and from the rest of the world (mostly the US, 
European Union and Japan) are below predicted levels. Since these results come from 
point estimates with no statistical significance attached to them, the authors then re-
estimate the model with dummies for WBGS trade with Israel and for WBGS trade 
with the rest of the world. In this case the coefficient on the former is positive but not 
significant, while that on the latter is negative and significant.
14 The authors interpret 
these findings as showing that ‘no support can be found for the hypothesis that [Israel 
and WBGS] overtrade with each other’ but the WBGS ‘undertrades with the rest of 
the world’ (p91).  
 
These findings are somewhat surprising, since on their earlier results WBGS exports 
are predicted to be lower than actual by $203m to Israel but higher by $119m to the 
EU, by $32m to the US and by $20m each to Japan and Egypt, while imports are 
predicted to be $1552m lower than actual from Israel, but higher by $285m from the 
EU, $181m from the US and $76m from Japan: the differences in trade with Israel are 
very large.
15 Overall, the predicted pattern of trade implies that 32% of WBGS 
exports and 19% of WBGS imports should be to/from Israel (as against the existing 
94% and 86%), 28% of exports (25% excluding the UK) and 38% of imports (32%) 
to/from the EU, 8% of exports and 18% of imports to/from the US, 5% of exports and 
7% of imports to/from Japan, and 5% of exports and 2% of imports to/from Egypt.
16   
 
What is important here is not the historical issue of the extent to which WBGS trade 
was distorted by occupation, but the question of how and where Palestine will trade in 
the future. Bannister and Erickson von Allmen explain their initial results partly in   12
terms of the existence of a currency union between the WBGS and Israel, and recent 
research has found very large effects on trade patterns from currency unions (see 
Frankel and Rose, 2002; Rose, 2000, 2001; Mélitz, 2001). Insofar as the existence of a 
currency union is crucial to, but not allowed for in, these results, they cannot provide 
useful indications of what trade patterns are likely to develop in an independent 
Palestinian state, which may well choose another currency arrangement.
17 Even so, 
their results suggest the largest proportion of its trade – 35% – will be with the EU 
(30% excluding the UK which may stay outside the Eurozone), 22% with Israel, 15% 
with the US, and 6% with Japan. The greater importance of the EU than the US in 
trade is a general characteristic of Middle Eastern countries. It is not highlighted in the 
three main gravity model studies of the region –  Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000), Blavy 
(2001) and Miniesy, Nugent and Yousef (2002) – all of which group trade with 
industrialised countries (North America, Europe and Japan) in the same category. 
However, Frankel and Rose (2002) report that for each of Egypt, Israel and Turkey 
there is more trade with the Eurozone than with the dollar zone, and hence predict that 
for each of them there would be much higher gains from joining EMU than from 
dollarisation.  
 
5 ANCHOR  CURRENCIES 
There are four currencies which can be considered as possible anchor currencies 
under currency board or other arrangements, or even (in the first two cases) as 
candidates for currency union with a new Palestinian state: the NIS, the JD, the euro 
and the USD.  
   13
To serve as a good anchor, a currency needs first of all to be stable and credible. 
Stability has two main dimensions: inflation and the exchange rate. Table 3.3 presents 
some basic data on the ex post performance of the possible anchors over recent 
decades (given the absence of long runs of data on an aggregated basis, some of the 
Eurozone data is for Germany
18). On inflation, it is clear that in the past the Eurozone 
(Germany) has experienced the lowest inflation of the four, followed by the US, then 
Jordan and lastly Israel; and the four are ranked in more or less the same order in 
terms of the volatility of inflation. Changes in nominal exchange rates follow broadly 
the same pattern,
19 while changes in real exchange rates (which are not available for 
Jordan) have been smaller for Israel (despite the high volatility of nominal exchange 
rates
20) than for the US and the Eurozone. 
[Table 3.3 near here] 
 
A second criterion for a good anchor currency is that its country and that of the 
currency which proposes to peg to it should not be subject to asymmetric shocks. 
Arnon and Spivak (1996b; see also Arnon et al, chapter 6) used the Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993) technique to identify transitory (demand) and permanent (supply) 
shocks in Israel, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jordan over the period 1968-92. 
They found that the transitory shocks were generally not well correlated, except 
between Israel and the West Bank. But the permanent shocks between each of Israel, 
the WB and the GS were highly correlated, while those between any of these and 
Jordan were not. These findings are probably explicable in terms of the trade and 
other restrictions imposed by Israel on the occupied territories, and the rupture in 
trade links between them and Jordan. Whether the economies will continue to   14
experience correlated shocks in the future depends primarily on the extent of changes 
in trade patterns.  
 
On both these criteria past performance is, of course, not necessarily a good guide to 
future performance. To shed some light on the latter, Table 3.4 presents some data 
taken from a recent survey carried out at the Bank of England of the monetary 
frameworks in some 90 countries (Fry et al, 2000). This survey used a wide range of 
evidence, including both published data and extensive questionnaire answers from the 
central banks concerned, and it tried to answer questions – eg about the focus of 
monetary policy – in partial and qualitative, rather than all-or-nothing, terms. In the 
absence of data for the Eurozone, data for Germany – which are sometimes more and 
sometimes less relevant – are given. The table also provides averages for the 
industrialised, transition and developing economies included in the study (27, 22 and 
44 respectively).
21 
[Table 3.4 near here] 
 
The first section of the table gives assessments of the short and medium term focus of 
policy. For the sample as a whole, industrialised countries on average focus heavily 
on both the exchange rate and inflation, while transition and developing countries put 
more emphasis on money as well. Israel (classified in this study as an industrialised 
country) is primarily an inflation targeter, despite its earlier emphasis on exchange 
rate targets (crucial to the stabilisation plan after the runaway inflation of the mid-
1980s). Reinhart and Rogoff (2002, Appendix III) classify Israel from February 1991 
as operating a de facto crawling band around the US dollar, and refer to ‘an ever 
widening band, which was 39.2% as of December 30, 2000’. Jordan has a strong   15
focus on the exchange rate, coupled with some focus on money – for which targets 
have been announced since 1992 – and less on inflation. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002, 
Appendix III) classify Jordan as operating a de facto peg to the USD since September 
1995. The USA, on the other hand, has no focus on the exchange rate (and is 
classified by Reinhart and Rogoff as a free floater), but some focus on money (as of 
1998; monetary target ranges ceased to be announced from 2000) and some on 
inflation. Other observers, eg Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) have tended to see the 
US as an informal inflation targeter. Germany is shown in the table as having a heavy 
emphasis on money, and a considerable part of that emphasis continues to be present 
in the ‘monetary policy strategy’ of the European Central Bank together with a focus 
on price stability (eg Angeloni et al, 1999; Issing et al, 2001);
22 the Eurozone is also a 
free floater. 
 
Since different types of policy focus may work efficiently in different circumstances, 
and their effectiveness may depend heavily on the commitment of the monetary 
authorities, a more important aspect of whether a currency would be a desirable 
anchor currency is probably the institutional set-up. The Bank of England study, like 
those of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Cukierman (1992) and others, 
classifies the US Federal Reserve and the German Bundesbank as highly independent 
(and the ECB is usually taken to be even more independent than Germany). The 
Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) is less independent than these three but above the 
average for developing countries, and the Bank of Israel (BoI) is a bit less 
independent again. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve is given as highly 
accountable, more so than the CBJ, while the BoI is supremely accountable and the 
Bundesbank (and, it is generally assumed, similarly the ECB) much less so. Finally,   16
the US Fed gives good explanations of policy, while those of the ECB are open to 
some criticism,
23 and the BoI and the CBJ lag behind. 
 
Finally, it is useful to consider the business cycles in the four possible anchor 
countries. Figure 3.1 shows output gaps, derived from a simple regression of quarterly 
GDP on a linear and quadratic trend, for the Eurozone, the US and Israel. The 
Eurozone had a pronounced boom in the early 1990s, associated with German 
reunification, while the US had a deep recession in the early 1980s and a boom in the 
late 1980s. Since then, however, the cycles in the two have come more into line with 
each other. Israel, on the other hand, shows a much less smooth, indeed distinctly 
jerky, cycle which is not synchronised with either the Eurozone or the US. This 
exercise cannot be replicated for Jordan because of the lack of quarterly data, but 
Figure 3.2 shows the annual growth rates for each of the four countries. Again Israel’s 
growth is more variable than that of the Eurozone or the US, but Jordan’s growth rate 
is even more so, with extreme outliers in 1989 and 1992. 
[Figures 3.1 and 3.2 near here] 
 
Overall, it seems clear that the US dollar and the euro have to be considered as 
acceptable anchors in themselves (that is, without regard to the ship to be anchored). 
The Israeli NIS has been much less stable in the past, while its relatively low level of 
central bank independence suggests that it is not possible to be confident that the 
improvement of recent years will be sustained (and there are ongoing tensions 
between central bank and finance minister). Jordan also has a record of some 
instability, with a large devaluation in 1988/89, but its central bank is more 
independent than the developing country average.   17
 
6 OPTIMAL  MONETARY  FRAMEWORKS 
An optimal monetary framework should maximise the growth and level of welfare in 
the economy concerned. In particular, there are four ways in which an ideal 
framework could contribute to this end. First, it should ensure price stability, 
understood as inflation of less than 5%.
24 Second, it should facilitate long run 
economic growth, by contributing to a stable and predictable macro environment. 
That implies that it should minimise domestic aggregate demand shocks, which 
includes preventing conflict between monetary and fiscal policy, and minimise 
external aggregate demand shocks, by ensuring stability and non-misalignment of the 
real exchange rate. Third, it should provide a credible commitment to price stability, 
in order to minimise the risk premium in long term interest rates. And fourth, it should 
provide a framework within which financial stability can be assured, which means, in 
particular, that there should be some provision for a lender of last resort (LOLR) 
function. 
 
A new Palestinian state will start from a position in which there is no established 
central bank with a historical record that could induce credibility, and in which the 
fiscal policy institutions may be subject to strong political pressures. Such 
considerations have been widely taken to imply that an independent currency with a 
floating exchange rate would not be viable, at least in any near future, and that a 
highly fixed exchange rate operated by a currency board with minimal discretion 
would be desirable – eg Hamed (1999), Naqib (1999) and Erickson von Allmen and 
Fischer (2001).
25 This would imply a rather ‘tougher’ regime than those chosen in 
most cases by comparable (but ‘older’) economies, as reported in section 2. There are,   18
of course, some disadvantages as well as advantages associated with currency boards 
(notably the difficulty of making any LOLR function available), but Williamson 
(1995) has argued that currency boards are more suitable (and more likely) in small 
open economies, particularly when they start with low confidence.  
 
However, the central problem here is that a currency board requires a reserve currency 
to be used as a peg.
26 The implications of sections 4 and 5 above are that there is no 
fully satisfactory peg for a Palestinian currency board, or for a more conventional 
fixed rate regime. On the trade side, the preference must be for a peg to the currency 
area with which the Palestinian economy does the largest share of its trade, in order to 
maximise the development of trade and its benefits in terms of growth. At the moment 
the largest share of WBGS trade is with Israel, but in the future, according to the 
results of Bannister and Erickson von Allmen (2001), it is likely to be with the EU. 
However, the share predicted remains, for example, well below the shares of trade 
that many Eurozone countries have with their currency union partners.
27  On the other 
hand, it seems likely that Jordan, and to a lesser extent Israel, will also tend to 
increase their trade with the EU, and that would reduce the risks associated with a peg 
to the euro.  
 
With respect to the intrinsic characteristics of the possible anchors, the USD and the 
euro are more attractive anchors because they are much more stable than the NIS and 
the JD, and this is likely to continue. The fact that cyclical divergences between the 
US and the Eurozone have become rather smaller over the last decade might indicate 
that there is less danger of asymmetric shocks from a peg to one or the other, but this   19
convergence has not diminished the fluctuations in the exchange rate between the 
USD and the euro.  
 
It should also be noted that the introduction of a new Palestinian currency is unlikely 
to be straightforward or rapid. The status quo in the WBGS involves three different 
currencies being used, and under the liberal economic arrangements usually envisaged 
for the new Palestinian state (and with workers continuing to commute to Israel and 
receiving wages in NIS) it is difficult to see how the comprehensive use of a new 
currency could be imposed. Its acceptance will have to be earned, as Arnon and 
Spivak (1996a, pp8-10) and Erickson von Allmen and Fischer (2001, p126) have 
recognised, and in a context of network externalities it is clear that established 
currencies exert a strong gravitational pull.
28  
 
In the absence of a peg which is clearly superior to the others, and in a situation where 
the introduction of a new currency will be far from easy, it might seem sensible to 
exercise caution: to wait and see how trade patterns develop, and to focus the new 
state’s limited managerial and policy-making resources on other policy areas first. But 
the importance of currency unions for trade patterns, and the de facto currency union 
of the status quo, suggest that such caution would act as a drag on the desirable 
redirection of Palestinian trade flows. Some more decisive action is therefore 
necessary. 
 
The obvious approach is first to identify the long run goal, and then to construct short 
run policy as a way of moving towards that goal. The evidence presented in section 4 
suggests that the largest share of Palestinian trade will eventually be with the   20
Eurozone, while section 5 argues that the euro is intrinsically a suitable anchor 
currency. The long run goal should therefore be a (fixed rather than highly fixed) peg 
to the euro, operated by a central bank which has developed the competence and the 
credibility to use some discretion in monetary policy (notably to change the exchange 
rate parity in case of a severe asymmetric shock) and to act as a lender of last resort. 
That implies the introduction of a new currency, but this should be facilitated by its 
introduction under a currency board arrangement with an initial peg to the NIS; as the 
Argentinian example makes clear this will require sound fiscal as well as monetary 
institutions. Later, when trade patterns have begun to change and the Palestinian 
Monetary Authority has become more of a central bank, the peg can be switched to 
the euro,
29 and policy can become gradually less rigid as has happened in countries 
like Singapore and Hong Kong (Williamson, 1995; Naqib, 1999). This would 
eventually enable the central bank to operate some limited discretion for dealing with 
asymmetric shocks, and to act as a lender of last resort.  
 
7 CONCLUSION  
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that a new Palestinian state has initially 
no alternative but to opt for a relatively hard peg, with a low level of discretion in 
monetary policy. However, there is no fully satisfactory anchor currency, in terms of 
both the likely trade flows of Palestine and the intrinsic stability of the anchors. In 
addition, the introduction of a new currency in the Palestinian context where three 
external currencies are currently in use is likely to be difficult. However, there are 
strong reasons – connected not with the seigniorage gains, which are likely to be 
small, but with the impact on trade patterns – for moving away from the status quo of 
an informal currency union with Israel. The evidence suggests that in the long run the   21
Eurozone will become Palestine’s most important trading partner, and the euro is a 
stable and suitable anchor currency. The long run goal should therefore be a monetary 
framework with a peg to the euro but some scope for short run discretion and for the 
operation of the LOLR function. In the short run Palestine should move towards this 
goal via the introduction of a Palestinian currency under a currency board, with a peg 
initially to the NIS but later to the euro.    22
NOTES 
 
1 For a wider ranging focus on developing countries see Fischer (2001) and ECB 
(2003a). 
2 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) had shown that in some cases announced regimes did not 
correspond well to governments’ practices. 
3 Arnon and Kanafani (this volume) give the 2001 population of the WBGS as 3.3 
million; a large immigration of refugees from Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and elsewhere 
following a full peace settlement could raise that figure to 4 million or more. 
4 Erickson von Allmen and Fischer (2001) give 1999 GDP for the WBGS (not PPP 
adjusted) as US$4.2 billion as against $7.5 bn for Jordan. The Human Development 
Report 2002 gives Jordanian (Israeli) GDP in 2000 as $8.3 bn ($110.4 bn) 
(unadjusted) and $19.4 bn ($125.5 bn) (PPP adjusted). It seems likely that the WBGS 
price level is dominated by that of Israel (see Arnon et al, 1997, pp13-14), which 
means that the PPP adjustment would make a much smaller difference for the WBGS 
than for Jordan, though some increase over time from a population influx also needs 
to be considered. 
5 Bannister and Erickson von Allmen (2001) give data showing WBGS trade between 
1980 and 1999 mostly in the range 100-120% of GDP. The ratio of imports to GDP 
might be lower for the new state, but the ratio of exports is likely to be higher. 
6 Countries with a population below 0.3 million are excluded as being too small to be 
useful comparators. Countries whose regimes are not classified by Reinhart and 
Rogoff are also excluded. 
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7 The group includes countries with widely differing growth performances, from 
Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Malta and Mauritius which had GDP per capita 
growth 1990-2000 of 3% p.a. or more, to Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Tajikistan which 
all had sharply negative growth. 
8 Excluding from the later period those countries which did not exist as separate 
entities in 1990 makes little difference to the comparison. 
9 Israeli inflation over this period averaged 9.6%. 
10 See Williamson (1995, p20) for the argument that seigniorage should be calculated 
in terms of the return on the assets backing the currency issue, but that if currency is 
backed by domestic assets instead of foreign exchange its return might in fact be 
lower. 
11 For the three subperiods Jordan had seigniorage of 2.3, 1.4 and 4.3% respectively, 
with inflation of 9.1, 2.6 and 11.8%; while Israel had seigniorage of 1.6, 1.6 and 
0.5%, with inflation at 118.4, 152.5 and 15.9%. The study’s calculation of seigniorage 
uses the inflation tax (determined by the inflation rate) on the central bank’s liabilities 
in reserve money, but also makes some adjustments for interest payments on bank 
reserves (see Fry et al, 1996, p34). 
12 It should be noted that the definition of seigniorage is not straightforward (see, for 
example, Bofinger, 2001, chapter 11), but the conclusion reached here does not 
depend on a particular definition. 
13 Their results suggest that WBGS imports from and exports to Jordan would be 2.2 
and 3.9% of total WBGS imports/exports respectively in the first situation, and 5.8 
and 6.4% in the second. 
   24
 
14 The former is 1.45 for imports and 1.36 for exports, with standard errors of 1.25 
and 1.27 respectively. The latter is –1.51 for imports and –1.59 for exports, with 
standard errors of 0.17 in both cases. 
15 Since the point estimates are roughly the same for each dummy, the difference in 
significance must be mainly the result of a difference in the variance of the dummy 
variables across observations. This will necessarily be higher for the WBGS-rest of 
world dummy since there are more observations where the dummy is equal to one, 
while for the WBGS-Israel dummy there is only one such observation. I am indebted 
to Chris Adam for this point. 
16 They also predict almost no change in WBGS imports to or exports from Jordan, at 
1.2% and 3.8% respectively. 
17 An independent Palestinian state could also choose to open a seaport so that it 
would no longer be landlocked. 
18 Since the European Central Bank (ECB) was modelled partly on the Bundesbank 
future Eurozone performance is likely to be comparable to past German performance. 
19 The data for Jordan’s exchange rate are against the USD rather than effective, and 
the latter – if it were available – would presumably have moved rather more: while the 
JD’s rate against the USD remained at 1.410 from 1997 to 2001, that against the euro 
went from 1.244 in 1997 to 1.606 in 2000 and 1.576 in 2001 (data from Central Bank 
of Jordan website). 
20 In the mid-1980s this may be a reflection of the stylised fact that purchasing power 
parity holds more nearly in hyperinflations, but from 1986 it is probably more the 
result of the crawling band exchange rate regime which was operated. 
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21 These (unweighted) averages were calculated from the distributions in Tables 4.1-6 
of Fry et al (2000).  
22 Some authors have claimed that the Bundesbank was in practice more of an 
inflation targeter; see Bofinger (2001, section 9.2). The ECB’s ‘monetary policy 
strategy’ is changing, albeit slowly, see ECB (2003b). 
23 See, for example, Alesina et al (2001) and Begg et al (2002). 
24 See Fischer (1994, section 2.3) and Bofinger (2001, section 5.2) for balanced 
discussions of the evidence on inflation and growth. The inflation targets of major 
central banks (the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of England, etc) are around 2-3%, and it is 
difficult to see what would justify a new Palestinian state having an objective that was 
significantly higher. 
25 An additional argument for fixity is that this might facilitate the avoidance of a 
Dutch disease problem arising from large (private and official) capital inflows in the 
first years of the new state. 
26 The choice of the appropriate peg seems not to have been widely discussed. Hamed 
(1999) favours a dollar peg on the grounds of JD and NIS instability, but recognises 
that this will expose the Palestinian economy to shocks arising from changes in the 
exchange rates of its main trading partners against the USD. Naqib (1999) does not 
seem to identify the appropriate peg for the currency board which he advocates for the 
short run, but (in company with Dabbagh, 1999) favours currency union with Jordan 
in the longer run. Erickson von Allmen and Fischer briefly discuss the choice between 
the NIS, the USD and the euro but present no conclusion. 
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27 For example, in 1988 – ie at a relatively early stage in the process of European 
monetary integration – the 12 members of the European Community obtained 58% of 
their imports on average from other members, and exported 60% of their exports to 
them (Hitiris, 1991, p208). 
28 This is one reason why European governments opted for the ‘institutional’ rather 
than the ‘currency competition’ approach to monetary union (Gros and Thygesen, 
1998, chapter 10). 
29 One way of handling this transition would be by fixing to a basket of the NIS and 
the euro and gradually reducing the weight on the former and increasing that on the 
latter. The main disadvantage of this proposal is the lower level of transparency (even 
if the weights are publicly announced).   27
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